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BOOK NOTES
How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA. By Richard Neely. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xvii, 233. $15.00.
Constitutional scholars have produced numerous works at-
tempting to justify judicial activism. Justification seems necessary
because the notion that appointed judges with life tenure can over-
turn any executive or legislative act seems inconsistent with govern-
ment by majority will. In How Courts Govern America, Justice Richard
Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals argues that a
working democracy requires judicial review and proposes several
novel criteria for deciding when judicial activism is desirable.
In the book's first chapter, the author sweepingly asserts that
courts can use traditional constitutional law principles to justify any
result in any particular case (p. 10). He also contends that, although
decisions are not determined by the "legal principles" recited in the
opinions, law is not unprincipled. Neely uses a myth sys-
tem/operational system analysis to derive the principles that he
claims actually control decisions. The myth system of government is
the democratic ideal.' The operational system is, according to Neely,
how things really work. It differs from the myth system because of
human weakness and the myth system's inherent inconsistencies and
defects.2 Neely's focus is thus on the legislative and executive
branches' nondemocratic aspects, which occur where the operational
system deviates from the myth system. The author asserts that the
courts' responsibility is to balance these deviations from the myth
system.
Neely draws upon his experience as a state representative to
show why legislatures fail to pass needed bills, leaving gaps that the
courts must fill. To insure reelection, a legislator is pressured to in-
troduce special interest legislation beneficial to politically potent
I Unfortunately, Neely never precisely defines the term "myth system," a phrase he at-
tributes to W. Michael Reisman (p. 12 n.4). Reisman defines the "myth system" as the "offi-
cial picture"-how our society says the government ought to behave. W.M. REISMAN,
FOLDED LIES 15-18 (1979).
2 Neely claims that "there are always design defects in the myth system which make it
impossible to construct a real edifice on the plan given by the myth" (p. 12). His argument
would have been stronger if he had given concrete examples of these defects. He also states
that, since the myth system has generally worked well, we are reluctant to tamper with it to
remove its inconsistencies (p. 13).
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groups in his district. If all bills were automatically brought to the
floor for a vote, much "predatory" special interest legislation would
pass because of political pressure rather than true majority approval,
Neely says. To prevent this, "[l]egislatures have intentionally
designed a cumbersome procedure for themselves in comparison to
the fairly streamlined procedure of the courts, because they wish to
frustrate the passage of special interest legislation" (p. 49). As an
example, the author describes how he once introduced a bill to help
the elderly, received favorable publicity, and then quietly had the
bill killed when he concluded that it was not a good idea.
This cumbersome system of procedural safeguards leads Neely
to the first of three criteria he uses to determine when courts should
take an active role: The courts should act when such safeguards trap
bills that legislatures would act upon in the myth system, where no
such safeguards exist. Under this criterion, he finds that Baker v.
Carr3 presents the best case for judicial activism (p. 14). There the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down the apportionment
of state senate seats by geography rather than by population. Since
the senators would not pass any bill changing the apportionment
plan under which they were elected, the state legislature's bicameral
structure completely frustrated the majority will of the rapidly-grow-
ing urban population. In contrast, the worst case for judicial activ-
ism would be where no safeguards exist; for example, a challenge to a
municipal law passed at a New England town meeting, where every
adult participates (p. 49).
Neely's second criterion for judicial activism is the existence of a
popular consensus regarding a problem's solution. A purely demo-
cratic process could not solve a problem lacking a consensus solution
any better than a real legislature; therefore the courts should not in-
terfere. Inflation, for example, lacks a consensus solution. The au-
thor points out several ways in which the courts could develop a
constitutional law of inflation fighting (p. 70). 4 Without a consensus
solution, however, they are not likely to do so. Neely contends that
courts should not act if no consensus solution exists.
A case decided by Neely's own court5 illustrates a third criterion
for appropriate judicial review: lack of access to the legislative pro-
3 389 U.S 186 (1962).
4 For example, courts could consider expansion of the money supply a deprivation of
property in violation of the due process clauses, or could curtail inflation-causing governmen-
tal regulations on the ground that they impair the obligations of contracts in violation of
article I, section 1 of the Constitution.
5 Pauly v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
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cess by the affected groups. The plaintiffs in that case challenged
West Virginia's school financing system because some rural schools
were poorly financed. Although he considers this a close case, Neely
dissented from the majority decision striking down the financing sys-
tem.6 He believed the legislature had actively worked to reconcile
the various, well-represented interests. Because he thought that no
group was denied access to the political process, Neely believed this
was an improper case for judicial activism (pp. 176-77).
Like the legislative branch, the executive branch is also prone to
disparities between the myth and operational systems. A few demo-
cratically elected officials cannot directly control huge numbers of
bureaucrats. Instead of responding to the majority will, Neely as-
serts, bureaucracies respond to their own institutional goal of expan-
sion (pp. 90-95). Neely argues that courts must therefore compensate
for bureaucracies' tendency to over-regulate, just as they must com-
pensate for legislatures' tendency to under-legislate. The judiciary
can be trusted to oversee bureaucrats because it does not share the
same institutional bias; since judges must do their own work, they
lack incentive to expand. Neely also argues that judges are more
likely than career administrators to understand the political system
and appreciate different sides of an issue. Judges come from a wide
range of backgrounds, while senior bureaucrats spend most of their
lives in one organization (pp. 110-11). Neely's argument falters here,
however, because he does not develop any principled limitations on
when the courts should overule administrative agency decisions. His
theory apparently relies on judges' heavy workloads as the only limit
on their power to overturn any executive decision they consider
unwise.
Written in a lively, unpedantic style, Neely's book contains
many examples showing keen insight into our political institutions.
In applying his analysis to criminal procedure reform, for instance,
he describes some abuses in the criminal justice system and convinc-
ingly explains how reforms like the exclusionary rule alleviate them
(pp. 150-69).
Unfortunately, the book suffers from organizational problems
that detract from its cohesiveness. Neely's excursions often stray too
far from his main argument. He devotes one chapter to an interest-
ing commentary on abuses in the American electoral process and an
analysis of democracy in South Africa, none of which he satisfactorily
relates to his central theme (pp. 115-44). Although the book's gen-
6 Id. at 897-900.
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eral tone is optimistic--courts are capable of compensating for the
problems of legislatures and bureaucracies-it ends with a pessimis-
tic apology for Neely's failure to provide any grandiose schemes for
reform (pp. 218-26).
Few constitutional scholars will likely accept the author's postu-
late that traditional constitutional law principles impose no genuine
limits on courts. This book is valuable nonetheless, because consider-
ations drawn from the nondemocratic aspects of the legislative and
executive branches do play some part in judicial decisionmaking,
even though they may not be expressly set forth in the opinions.
Neely believes that trying to understand these considerations, instead
of ignoring them, will help us use them intelligently (p. 13). How
Courts Govern America offers a stimulating view of our legal institutions
that should provoke much thought among lawyers and nonlawyers
alike.
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